Yemen’s Stability Is Dependent on a Recognition of the State’s Diverse Group Identities

At first glance, it appeared that the establishment of a republic in North Yemen in 1962, and the subsequent unification with South Yemen in 1990 led to the birth of a single national identity. The idea was to mend the country’s past divisions by creating a single banner for citizens to rally around—a new flag for the unified Republic of Yemen. But, it quickly became clear that this identity was aspirational at best.

In the 1990s, following the establishment of the single, modern Yemeni state,  long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime enhanced the fortunes of the northern region’s tribal and military elite at the expense of others, which sowed further divisions. By neglecting, and at times actively suppressing  society’s diverse tribal, regional and religious associations, Saleh, who came to power in 1978, failed to build meaningful national unity or an inclusive economy and political system. Many attempted to coalesce citizens around the idea that both North and South Yemen had overthrown previous governing powers. Northerners rebelled against the Imamate in 1962 and Southerners chased British colonizers from their shores in 1967. But this narrative didn’t really honor the nuances of both experiences. Instead of promoting equality, Saleh, a northern tribesmen, empowered those closest to him, further entrenching a gulf between separate northern and southern identities. This tension simmered for decades, threatening a fragile nation state. Finally, in 2011, Arab Spring protestors saw an opportunity to level the playing field for various groups that had been oppressed during Saleh’s rule.

Following the 2011 uprising, the country embarked on reconciliation talks called the National Dialogue Conference, which took place from 2013-2014.  The conference was meant to partially rectify some of the institutional injustices that Saleh’s government supported. Over the course of the conference, representatives from Yemen’s diverse social and political groups came to an agreement on many issues, including a proposal to form a federal state and to enact policies that would prevent the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a single political party or body. A federal model of governance held the promise of creating a pluralistic system that would more equitably divide power among Yemen’s various groups.  Because this push for decentralized power threatened Saleh’s still outsized influence in Yemen, behind the scenes, he encouraged the Houthis to subvert the political process. Indeed, when the group took control of the capital Sana’a in 2014, the fragile process of building a democratic state fell apart and has not since recovered.

The protests of 2011 weakened the central government. Some transitional-period reforms, such as restructuring the military, also chipped away at it. As a result, a power vacuum emerged that the Houthis eventually capitalized on in the country’s north. Although the Houthis, who started as a religious movement, were persecuted by Saleh prior to the Arab Spring, they eventually aligned with him, paving the way for their takeover of Sana’a in 2014. In this turn of events though, they have gone from being marginalized to now excluding, silencing and victimizing others. Their singular domination in northern Yemen has re-enforced identity divisions with southern Yemenis. Many fear that the current situation represents an institutional entrenchment of identities that have a prejudicial or discriminatory tendency. To overcome this, Yemen needs to radically rethink what a national identity might look like. They need to be pragmatic about a governing system that unites them while at the same time allows for separate regional identities to co-exist and have equal standing.