Tribal Mediation and Community Safety: Essential Foundations for Long-lasting Peace in Yemen

Tribes have long played a central role in maintaining security and resolving conflicts in Yemen, particularly in times of crisis and conflict. Through collective responsibility, tribal customs, and codes of honor (known as Urf), they have historically provided an essential system of social order and justice across much of the country.

During the ongoing war, tribes have emerged as key actors in promoting community safety, mediating disputes, and resolving conflicts at the local level. Their ability to de-escalate violence, negotiate local ceasefires, and secure safe passage for civilians has made them indispensable in protecting vulnerable communities and limiting the spread of violence. This traditional system remains resilient despite the war, adapting to new challenges and modern threats.

As hybrid and non-state armed groups have proliferated over the past decade, often operating outside state control and lacking adequate oversight, human rights violations have surged. In this volatile environment, tribal mechanisms have proven critical to ensuring accountability and safeguarding civilians. Civil society has increasingly leveraged these tribal systems, integrating them into efforts to address community needs and promote local peacebuilding efforts.

This paper provides an insight into tribal mediation in Yemen and its role in community safety and local peacebuilding during the current war. It offers some suggestions on ways to engage tribal conflict resolution mechanisms to inform current efforts to reach a ceasefire and, ultimately, an end to the war.

Background about tribes

While the role of the tribes in society and politics has been debated for decades, they are generally stereotyped as lawless, anti-state, resistant to the rule of law, and inherently violent. Influenced by the United States’ historical perception of Yemen as a lawless frontier, many Western analysts portray the country as a dichotomy between cities and a mosaic of tribal territories beyond the reach of the state.¹

Yemen’s 1965 revolutions overthrew the Imamate in the north, where leadership positions had been restricted to Sayyids, who claimed descent from Prophet Mohammed. Following the revolution, the political field opened up for tribespeople, culminating in figures like former president Ali Abdullah Saleh rising from tribal roots to leadership. The increased influence of tribal figures in the Saleh regime created an anti-tribal bias, particularly among urban Yemenis. A narrative emerged, portraying tribesmen as backward and blaming tribal culture for Yemen’s crises. This view overlooks the tribes’ role in local governance and conflict resolution, focusing instead on tribalism as a cause of instability.² This narrative frequently conflates tribal leaders, who gained from Saleh’s patronage system, with their tribes, which, by contrast, remained marginalized as a result of corruption and political turmoil.³

Geographically, tribes are territorial entities typically organized into villages or clusters of villages. Functionally, they are social units governed by tribal customary law, known as Urf, which can be seen as a social contract among tribe members, between tribespeople and their sheikhs, and in regulating relationships between different tribes and between tribes and the state.⁴

Tribes are egalitarian rather than hierarchical institutions, meaning tribal leaders, or sheikhs, are considered equals to their tribespeople. Many sheikhs inherit their positions, but they must meet specific criteria to be recognized as such. These criteria include experience and knowledge of tribal law; a demonstrated ability to resolve conflicts; generosity, bravery, morality, and protection of the weak; and representing the tribe’s interests before other tribes and the state.⁵

While sheikhs can influence their members, they cannot force them to make specific choices and do not hold political authority over their tribes. Their legitimacy depends entirely on their ability to provide for their tribespeople and to resolve conflicts.⁶ The authority of tribal leaders, while deeply respected, holds sway primarily within the realm of tribal justice, where they serve as arbitrators.⁷ This decentralized power structure ensures that leadership within the tribe is rooted in consensus and mutual respect, rather than coercion.

The restorative nature of tribal customary law makes it well-suited for fostering reconciliation and sustainable peace

Yemenis have relied on tribal customary law to resolve conflicts and maintain order for millennia. For decades, Yemenis have viewed tribal conflict resolution mechanisms as more legitimate, accessible, effective, participatory, faster, and more trusted than the formal Yemeni justice system.⁸ Even before the current war, 90 per cent of Yemenis used tribal law to settle disputes.⁹ Following the fragmentation of the formal justice system after the Arab Spring in 2011, urban populations in cities like Aden and Taiz increasingly turned to informal mediation.¹⁰ The war accelerated this trend.

Tribal customary law in Yemen is a sophisticated set of rules that blend traditional practices, remnants of pre-Islamic Yemeni state laws, and certain Islamic codes.¹¹ The earliest documented manuscript of tribal law dates back to 1715 AD, originating in the Barat district of Al-Jawf, northeast of Sanaa. These rules subsequently spread to other tribes. Notably, tribal laws show a high degree of uniformity in conflict resolution procedures, with only minor differences typically related to terminology or the type and extent of compensation required.¹²

The ultimate purpose of tribal customary law is to maintain peace and order within and among tribes. It is designed to preserve social cohesion and to prioritize the interests of the community over those of individual tribespeople. The law is restorative rather than punitive, emphasizing compromise, empathy, the culture of apology, and the admission of wrongdoing as integral steps in the mediation process. These practices promote reconciliation and ensure durable solutions.¹³

Under the tribal system, civilian properties—such as mosques, schools, hospitals, markets, homes, private property, and some towns—are designated as safe havens, known as Hijra. Violence in these areas is punished by Almohadash, requiring 11 times the restitution for the same act of violence committed elsewhere.¹⁴ Additionally, cities and towns can sometimes be recognized as neutral zones. The homes of prominent sheikhs are traditionally respected as safe havens to ensure they remain accessible to those seeking assistance in conflict resolution. This respect for neutral zones underscores the tribes’ commitment to protecting communal welfare and facilitating peaceful mediation.

Civilians—particularly women, children, the elderly, and unarmed civilians—are protected under tribal law. A man should not be targeted if accompanied by women and children. Causing harm to them is regarded as a black ayb (severe shame, dishonor) and is typically punishable by heavy amends, which can amount to 11 times the blood money owed to a man.¹⁵

Tribal law is not only endorsed by the state but also actively utilized by the Yemeni government and top officials, including the president, who often seek tribal mediation to resolve complex issues. These include conflicts between certain clans and the state, road blockages, and mitigating civilian harm caused by counterterrorism operations.¹⁶ Yemeni Arbitration Law No. 22, passed in 1992, officially recognizes tribal arbitration. The law requires arbitration decisions to be registered with the court, and a sheikh is considered equal to a judge of First Instance, with his verdicts only subject to appeal at the Appeals Court level.¹⁷

Tribal Urf is largely based on arbitration

Tribal customary justice in Yemen is largely based on arbitration.¹⁸ A mediator’s role is to prevent escalation, secure a ceasefire in violent conflicts, and convince disputants to select an arbitrator or arbitrators. A mediator is typically an individual who recognizes the potential for conflict and voluntarily takes proactive steps to prevent escalation, guiding the involved parties toward arbitration. While they may not always be tribal leaders, mediators are usually individuals who influence the community.

With the help of the mediator/s, the disputants must choose the arbitrator themselves. By doing that, parties to the conflict accept the result of the verdict beforehand. This establishes trust in the process and demonstrates a commitment to implement the outcome. If any party disagrees with the verdict, they can escalate the issue through the tribal justice system or challenge it in the Appeals Court in the formal justice system.

In violent tribal conflicts, mediators often enter the conflict zone carrying white flags, compelling warring tribes to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue. Violations of this ceasefire result in serious consequences. Mediators then establish an immediate truce, typically lasting eight days, during which the parties agree on an arbitrator to resolve the conflict. Getting the parties to accept arbitration sometimes requires extensive shuttle diplomacy by the mediators, who may also rely on pressure from relatives and dignitaries within the tribes of the disputants to kickstart the arbitration process.

Each disputant presents the arbitrator with two key items. First, they offer material items such as guns or cars, known in tribal terms as Adal. This symbolic gesture marks the beginning of the arbitration process and represents a binding pledge to honor and adhere to the arbitrators’ verdict.¹⁹ In some cases, the tribe of the offender approaches the tribe of the victim offering apologies, Adal, guarantors, and stating a commitment to make amends, which leads to arbitration. This initial phase is normally ceremonial, attended by dozens of dignitaries and tribesmen from the tribes of the parties. These tribesmen form a circle around the stage where the arbitration is initiated, serving as witnesses to the commencement of the process and the disputants’ commitment to it.

Second, each party must bring a sheikh from their tribe to act as a guarantor. The guarantors participate in the negotiations on behalf of the disputants they represent and are responsible for ensuring that their respective tribes enforce the outcome of the arbitration process.²⁰ The presence of a respected tribal leader as a guarantor lends credibility to the process and reinforces the expectation that the verdict will be honored. This role ensures that the arbitration’s outcome is not just a matter of individual commitment but is also supported by the broader tribal authority. The sheikhs’ engagement helps bridge the gap between the arbitrator’s decision and its practical implementation within the tribal community.

Following the initiation of the process, arbitrators conduct both joint negotiation sessions and private caucuses (Barzah) with each party before reaching a final verdict. The tribal justice system allows parties to appeal at higher levels of tribal arbitration before the verdict becomes final and binding. Sheikhs at the appeals level are referred to by various names—maragha, manha, or mangadha—depending on their region.²¹ Maraghas, who possess extensive knowledge and expertise, are responsible for preserving and adapting customary laws in response to emerging circumstances.²²

Once the verdict is final, it becomes the responsibility of the tribe represented by the guarantor of each disputant to ensure its implementation. Tribal customary law is concerned most with honor and commitment to one’s word. Failure to respect the verdict is considered Ayb (shame, dishonorable).²³ If one of the disputants refuses to comply, they are punished by their tribe. This can take the form of banning them from participating in community activity, disowning them, or expelling them from the tribe. In a society that values honor over everything else, it becomes impossible to carry on without the support and respect of their tribes.²⁴

When the arbitration process involves the entire tribe in ensuring compliance, it reduces the likelihood of non-compliance and enhances the credibility of the arbitration system. The participatory nature of the tribal arbitration process is a cornerstone of the arbitration process. The involvement of not only the disputants and arbitrators but also the broader tribal collective in enforcing arbitration outcomes plays a critical role in establishing trust in the process.

Tribal mediation played a key role in mitigating the impact of the war on civilians, de-escalating tensions at the local level, and holding armed actors accountable

As the war drags on and the humanitarian situation worsens in Yemen, Yemeni mediators continue to play a vital role in resolving local conflicts, protecting communities from the spread of violence, and negotiating with conflict parties to mitigate the impact of the conflict on their communities. For example, tribal mediators have successfully negotiated the release of thousands of prisoners between the Yemeni government and the Houthis.²⁵ Influential tribal leaders on both sides have worked together to secure brief ceasefires, negotiate safe passage for civilians trapped near frontlines, and provide food and shelter to displaced populations.²⁶ In 2017, for instance, tribal mediation ended fighting in Al-Motoon, a town home to 50,000 residents from Al-Jawf tribes, significantly reducing civilian casualties and damage to civilian property. In 2019, tribal mediation swiftly reopened the main road connecting Aden with other southern cities after tribal leaders from Abyan intervened following infighting between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council.²⁷ Most recently, tribal mediations led to the opening of roads in Taiz and Marib.

In areas that experienced rapid urbanization and population growth, such as Marib, tribal mediation has been instrumental in reducing tension between security forces and local tribes. Tribes stepped in to fill the gap left by the deterioration of government security following the Houthi coup in 2014. For example, tribes deployed their members to secure roads in areas that run through their territory where carjacking had become a problem.²⁸

Over the past decade of civil war, hybrid and non-state armed groups have proliferated at an unprecedented rate, operating largely outside of state control. Formed along political and sometimes tribal lines, these groups often lack proper oversight and training, leading to widespread human rights violations. In this context, tribal mechanisms have emerged as one of the most effective means of ensuring accountability and protecting civilians. Tribal mediation has led to the release of civilians abducted by armed groups and forced armed commanders to transfer detainees to the formal legal system for due process. In tribal areas such as Marib, Shabwa, and Abyan, local security actors frequently turn to tribal mediators to hold members of tribes accountable and provide compensation to victims of abuse.²⁹ In Mahra, tribal pressure compelled the Saudis to investigate incidents where their backed forces opened fire on an anti-Saudi demonstration, resulting in the deaths of two protesters.³⁰

Civil society and tribes work together to support communities

When the Yemeni government collapsed following the Houthis’ coup in 2014, a de facto decentralization emerged. Local authorities, particularly in areas currently under the control of the Yemeni government and its allied forces, assumed many responsibilities previously managed by the central government. A significant aspect of this transition has been the growth of local civil society, particularly in tribal areas.³¹ Civil society leaders greatly value the role of tribal mediation in supporting project implementation, while tribal leaders express their appreciation for the contribution of civil society in helping their communities.³²

Tribal leaders facilitate access to humanitarian aid and resolve tensions that may arise between civil society organizations and beneficiaries. In more challenging cases, tribal mediation has successfully negotiated the release of civilians abducted by armed actors, often based on requests from civil society and human rights advocates.³³ Amidst the increasing anti-international organizations’ sentiment, which sometimes extends to local civil society organizations, tribal mediators have provided protection and reassurances to local communities about the benefits of civil society projects. Notably, some tribal leaders have even allowed their daughters to participate in these programs, which has helped build trust and credibility in these interventions.³⁴

The war has highlighted the complementary roles of tribal mediators and civil society, as the conflict has strained traditional tribal rules. Civil society has stepped in to address emerging issues, such as human rights abuses, by documenting these abuses and working with tribal mediators to pressure armed actors into releasing abducted civilians.³⁵ Local civil society in Yemen is more likely to achieve success by collaborating with tribal leaders rather than engaging directly with conflict parties. This approach is crucial due to the general distrust of civil society organizations among conflict actors.

The partnership between civil society and tribal leaders has become increasingly vital in navigating the complex landscape of the ongoing conflict. Civil society operates at both the local level and in collaboration with international actors, such as the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY), donors, and other global organizations. In this role, civil society has facilitated the channelling of tribal leaders’ perspectives to these international actors. Civil society organizes meetings that provide a platform for tribal mediators to collaborate and work with civil society, addressing pressing issues such as road openings, civilian protection, and expectations from the peace process.³⁶

Civil society provides modern tools, including conflict mapping, analysis, training, and planning, while tribal leaders contribute their influence and negotiation skills in areas they can influence, such as prisoner exchange and opening roads. Civil society advocates for local authorities and international actors to set priorities in ways that tribal leaders cannot directly achieve.³⁷

Tribal customary law faces challenges as a result of the war

Although tribal customary law has become increasingly sought after for conflict resolution both by civilians and local security actors, it faces significant challenges. The influx of military funding from external actors, the Yemeni government, and the Houthis has led to the rise of numerous influential leaders, particularly among the youth. These new sheikhs are not necessarily accountable to their communities but more concerned with promoting the agenda of the conflict party that supports them. “Before, there were a few notable sheikhs and Maraghas in each tribe that people turned to for mediation. After the war, many new sheikhs emerged,” said a civil society leader in Marib. This proliferation has upset existing tribal structures and created competition and power dynamics that undermine the ability of tribes to resolve conflicts effectively.³⁸

In government-controlled areas, tribes have managed to maintain unity and set aside differences to prevent political divisions from dragging their communities into the war. However, this stability has been undermined by a sharp decrease in funding since the truce began in April 2022. Fighters on the frontlines suddenly lost their primary source of income, and tribal leaders and military commanders, who were major beneficiaries of this funding, were also affected.³⁹ As the loss of economic incentives diminishes, the tribes’ ability to unify and exert influence is compromised, making them more vulnerable to external pressures and internal fragmentation. This, in turn, weakened the ability of the tribes to maintain cohesion.

In the north, the Houthis have worked tirelessly to subvert and dismantle the tribal structure. Through systematic repression, the Houthis have managed to subjugate the tribes in the north, replacing traditional tribal authority with their own network of supervisors.⁴⁰ This allowed the Houthis to create a parallel power structure that enhanced their control and reduced the tribes’ capacity to resist. Consequently, the functionality of the traditional tribal system has been undermined, becoming largely co-opted by the Houthis and no longer effectively managed by the tribes themselves.

The war economy, the proliferation of armed groups, and the large influx of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) into tribal areas all pose tremendous challenges to tribal customary law. Many of the violators of tribal law are young men who joined the frontlines as teenagers when the war started ten years ago. Their participation in the war distanced them from their tribal communities, making them more susceptible to violence.⁴¹ These developments have led to a surge in crime and security incidents previously unknown to the tribes, such as carjacking, extortion at makeshift checkpoints, and the use of heavy weapons in tribal conflicts. “Before the war, it was unheard of for anyone to violate homes. Homes were sacred. Now tribes fight each other with armored military vehicles,” said a female civil society leader in Marib. “Before each tribe managed to govern its area and prevent crimes and abuses. Now tribes no longer control their areas as before,” she added. Electronic blackmailing has also emerged as a new threat, affecting both women and men, with six reported suicides linked to this issue since the beginning of the year in Hareeb district in Marib alone.⁴²

The tribal system, however, remains resilient and continues to adapt in response to new challenges. To address the increase in violations, tribal arbitrators have escalated punishments and fines. For instance, during a recent conflict between Aal Awshan and Bin Maili sub-tribes in Marib, the arbitrator initially required each party to pay with a car. When this measure failed to deter further violations, he imposed a fine of one million Saudi Riyals on each party, which ultimately resolved the dispute. Additionally, tribal law has effectively addressed cases of electronic blackmailing in collaboration with local civil society.⁴³

Tribal mediation remains the most effective approach for resolving complex issues, such as prisoner exchange and reopening roads. Tribal mediators successfully reopened the Al-Joobah Road in Marib in June 2024 and the Toor Albaha Road connecting Taiz with Lahj in July 2024. In contrast, a local mediation led by academics failed to reopen the Dhlee-Demt road due to its strategy of engaging directly with political actors from the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council instead of utilizing tribal mediators.⁴⁴

Additionally, tribal mediation has been crucial in protecting certain villages and towns from the broader conflict. In tribal areas like Marib, Al-Jawf, and Shabwa, many tribal members travel across the frontlines to visit their homes or access markets under the protection of tribal leaders affiliated with the opposing side. In Taiz, local mediation has kept districts such as Shar’ab Al-Salam and Same’a relatively safe for residents regardless of their affiliation since 2015.⁴⁵

Looking forward: Community safety is a precursor to a successful ceasefire

Yemeni tribes endured immense hardship throughout the war. Most fighters come from tribes and the most critical frontlines are located in tribal territory. The tribes are eager for a ceasefire and to see an end to the conflict. Tribes are positioned to play a pivotal role in establishing or reinforcing a ceasefire, but this is contingent upon the genuine commitment of all conflict parties to a peaceful resolution Given their direct involvement in the fighting and the large displacement their communities have suffered, tribes are seeking a ceasefire that not only allows them to safely return to their homes but also provides fair compensation for their losses and guarantees the protection of their land and rights from future violations.⁴⁶

This paper, along with previous research, highlights that the success of a ceasefire hinges on the genuine commitment of the primary conflict parties to ending the conflict. Once a ceasefire is established, conflict parties are likely to rely on tribal mediation to navigate the complexities of its implementation.

While tribal leaders do not possess the authority to enforce a ceasefire agreement, their role will be crucial at the local level. Tribal mediation excels in this context, where mediators can work directly with field commanders to negotiate and oversee critical actions, such as withdrawing fighters from the frontlines, reopening roads, clearing landmines, and implementing temporary security measures to facilitate a smooth transition. Tribal mediation can also help with the return of IDPs and the reintegration of fighters into civilian lives.

At the community level, tribal mediation will be instrumental in promoting transitional justice beyond the war. Tribal mediation can prevent cycles of revenge stemming from decades-long infighting. The restorative nature of tribal mediation can address grievances, for example through compensation, resolve issues, and bring the community together to help rebuild trust and reintegrate fighters into civilian lives. By focusing on healing relationships and promoting local reconciliation, tribal mechanisms help put Yemen on a stable path to peace.

To leverage Yemeni tribal customary law in promoting the implementation of a ceasefire and advancing the peace process, donors and OSESGY should consider the following:

1. Prioritize the protection of communities near frontlines: A successful ceasefire begins with safeguarding the communities most impacted by the conflict. Ensure that the ceasefire agreement explicitly includes provisions requiring all parties to allow displaced communities to return home safely and to compensate them for their losses. As one civil society leader aptly noted, “Tribes can make or break a ceasefire, depending on how it affects them.”⁴⁷

• Incorporate civilian protection into the peace process: Lasting peace is impossible without justice. OSESGY should incorporate the concepts of civilian protection into the ceasefire and peace process. Consulting with local civil society and tribal leaders in areas near the frontlines is essential to help inform this process.  

• Support local civil society to enhance accountability and ceasefire implementation: Donors should prioritize funding initiatives to support and build the capacity of local civil society that is involved in community safety in collaboration with tribal leaders and communities. These programs can enhance accountability by building trust between communities and armed actors, ensuring compliance with ceasefire terms, and creating a foundation for sustainable peace.

Nadwa al-Dawsari, a veteran researcher, conflict analyst, and policy advisor with 20 years of experience in Yemen. She is a leading expert on Yemeni tribes and tribal conflict resolution mechanisms. Nadwa is currently a Non-resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute and a Fellow at the Center on Armed Groups. Her work can be found on her website www.yementribalvoices.org.

The views expressed in this research debrief are those of the author.

1. Charles Schmitz, ‘Understanding the Role of Tribes in Yemen’, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, October 2011, Vol 4 (10),  https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss106.pdf ; Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, ‘Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 4 (November 1995): 405–431.
2. ACAPS, ‘Tribes in Yemen: An Introduction to the Tribal System’, August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/acaps-thematic-report-tribes-yemen-introduction-tribal-system-august-2020
3. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, ‘Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 April 2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2012/04/tribal-governance-and-stability-in-yemen?lang=en
4. Ibid.
5. Faraj Abu Ghanem, Tribes and the State in Yemen, 1990, Dar Al-Manar, Cairo, pp. 187.
6. Paul Dresch (1994), Tribes, Government and History in Yemen, Clarendon Press Publications; Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in North Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon, Rand Corporation, 14 April 2010; Michael Horton, ‘The Tribes of Yemen: An Asset or Impediment to Stability? Part One’, Terrorism Monitor (blog), Jamestown Foundation, 6 January 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/the- tribes-of-yemen-an-asset-or-impediment-to-stability-part-one; Marieke Brandt, ‘The Irregulars of the Sa’ada War: Colonel Sheikhs and Tribal Militias in Yemen’s Huthi Conflict (2004–2010)’, in Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition, ed. Helen Lackner (London: Saqi Books, 2014).
7. Al-Dawsari, ‘Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen’; Nadwa Al-Dawsari, ‘Foe Not Friend: Yemeni Tribes and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Project on Middle East Democracy, 1 February 2018, https://mideastdc.org/publication/report-foe-not-friend-yemeni-tribes-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula.
8. Najwa Adra, ‘The Political Impact of Customary Law in Yemen’, paper presented at the ‘Culture, Power, Boundaries Seminar’, Columbia University, 15 April 2013; Laila Al-Zwaini, ‘The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges’, The Hague Institute for Innovation of Lwa (Hiil), September 2012, https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Rule-of-Law-in-Yemen.pdf
9. ‘Conflict Resolution in Yemen Today, a Report for the German Development Cooperation’, GTZ discussion paper, 2006. This is also confirmed by tribal leaders and citizens the author has been working with since 2005.
10. Erica Gaston and Nadwa Al-Dawsari, ‘Waiting for Change: The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen’, United States Institute of Peace, April 2023 https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/04/waiting-change
11. Rashad Al-Alimi, ‘Customary Methods to Resolve Conflict in Yemen’, Arwqh Foundation for Studies, Translation, and Publishing, 2022 (pp 68-69).
12. Al-Alimi, ‘Customary Methods to Resolve Conflict in Yemen’, pp.72-73.
13. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-04/Peacebuilding%20in%20the%20Time%20of%20War.pdf
14. Mohammed bin Ali Sayyad, 2007, ‘Al-Urf Al-Qabali wa Ahkamoh fi Al-Yeman’, [Tribal Customary Law and its Rules in Yemen] Dar Al-Kutub Al-Yamaniyah, Sanaa, Yemen, pp 71-72.
15. Abdulnasser Al-Muadaa, ‘Yemeni War Customary law’, 2016, National Dialogue Support Program.
16. Al-Dawsari, ‘Foe Not Friend’.
17. Earlier versions of the law were passed in 1976 and 1981. Laila Al-Zwaini, ‘The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges’, The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law, September, 2012, https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Rule-of-Law-in-Yemen.pdf
18. Al-Alimi, ‘Customary Methods to Resolve Conflict in Yemen’.
19. Sayyad, ‘Al-Urf Al-Qabali wa Ahkamoh fi Al-Yeman’, pp. 85.
20. Al-Alimi, ‘Customary Methods to Resolve Conflict in Yemen’; Sayyad, ‘Al-Urf Al-Qabali wa Ahkamoh fi Al-Yeman’; author’s previous interviews with tribal leaders from Marib and Al-Jawf.
21. Al-Dawsari, ‘Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen’.
22. Sayyad, ‘Al-Urf Al-Qabali wa Ahkamoh fi Al-Yeman’, p 21.
23. Layla Al-Zwaini, State and Non-State Justice in Yemen, United States Institute for Peace, December 2006.
24. Al-Alimi, ‘Customary Methods to Resolve Conflict in Yemen’, pp 152.
25. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11881
26. Center for Civilians in Conflict, ‘We did not know if we could die from bullets or hunger: Civilian Harm and Local Protection Measures in Yemen’, 16 January 2020.
27. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, ‘Peacebuilding in the Time of War: Tribal Ceasefire and De-Escalation Mechanisms in Yemen’, The Middle East Institute, April 2021.
28. Interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 30 July 2024.
29. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, ‘A Three-Part Formula to Persuade Armed Groups in Yemen to Respect Human Rights’, The Century Foundation, 15 May 2023, https://tcf.org/content/report/a-three-part-formula-to-persuade-armed-groups-in-yemen-to-respect-human-rights/
30. Ahmed Nagi, ‘Eastern Yemen’s Tribal Model for Containing Conflict’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 March 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/07/eastern-yemens-tribal-model-for-containing-conflict?lang=en
31. Hadil al-Mowafak, ‘The Role of Yemeni Civil Society in Shaping Security’, Yemen Policy Center, March 2021, https://www.yemenpolicy.org/the-role-of-yemeni-civil-society-in-shaping-security/; Mahdi Balghaith and Sadam Al-Adwar, ‘The Impact of War on Civil Society Organizations in Marib’, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, 22 January 2022, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/16278
32. Interview with civil society leaders from Marib, Al-Jawf, Shabwa during July-August 2024; interview with a prominent mediator, 6 August 2024.
33. Interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 29 July 2024; interview with a human rights advocate in Shabwa, 6 August 2024.
34. Interview with a female civil society leader in Marib, 30 July 2024.
35. Al-Dawsari, ‘A Three-Part Formula to Persuade Armed Groups in Yemen to Respect Human Rights’.
36. Interview with civil society leaders from Marib, Shabwa, and Al-Jawf, July-August 2024; interview with a prominent mediator, 6 August 2024.
37. Interview with civil society leaders from Marib, Shabwa, and Al-Jawf, July-August 2024; interview with a prominent mediator, 6 August 2024.
38. Interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 29 July 2024.
39. Interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 29 July 2024.
40. Andrea Carboni, ‘The Myth of Stability: Infighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories’, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), 9 February 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/02/09/the-myth-of-stability-infighting-and-repression-in-houthi-controlled-territories/
41. Interview with a female civil society leader from Marib, 30 July 2024.
42. Interview with a female civil society leader from Marib, 30 July 2024.
43. Interview with a female civil society leader from Marib, 30 July 2024.
44. Interview with a Yemeni mediator, 6 August 2024.
45. Fighters might be attacked in the checkpoints on the road leading up to their areas. Interview with a prominent mediator in Taiz, 7 August 2024.
46. Interview with a tribal leader in Marib, 15 July 2024; interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 29 July  2024; Al-Dawsari, ‘Peacebuilding in the Time of War: Tribal Ceasefire and De-Escalation Mechanisms in Yemen’, 2021.
47. Interview with a civil society leader in Marib, 29 July 2024.