The southern movement and the Hadi government compete over legitimacy across Yemen’s south. The STC’s particular strength in al-Dhali’ is due to the conflict dynamics in the governorate, the southern movement’s roots in al-Dhali’ and the historically weak state presence in the area. At the onset of Yemen’s civil war, al-Dhali’ experienced heavy fighting between March and June 2015, when Ansarallah attempted to take control of Aden. The collapse of state security institutions and the consequent empowerment of the southern resistance forces hardened the southern movement’s grip on the governorate. Although the IRG nominally controls state institutions in al-Dhali’, such as the governor’s office and the police, members of the southern movement rose within the ranks of the state and exercise de facto authority.

Many of those who’ve held positions within state structures over the last few years, including police officers, are loyal to the STC or are associated with the southern movement. This demonstrates the fine balance the two parties struck in their alliance; without recruiting southern movement members, the Hadi government would have lost the little influence it had in al-Dhali’. When it was in a slightly stronger position before the STC’s power grab, the IRG was able to sanction individuals who were too candid in their allegiances to the STC or the southern movement. For instance, Fadhl al-Jaadi, a leading member of Yemen’s Socialist Party (YSP) and al-Dhali’ governor between 2015 and 2017, was replaced because of his role in the STC. Hadi installed General Ali Saleh Muqbil as al-Jaadi’s successor, a military commander of the National Army who coordinated the military efforts against Ansarallah in al-Dhali’s northern districts. While Muqbil has no direct connections with the STC, he belongs to the group of forcibly retired officers from the former southern military, and thus is associated with the core of the southern movement that works alongside the STC.^[6]

Members of the southern movement and STC loyalists serve Hadi and the IRG only to the extent that it does not hurt the southern movement’s interests. While generally respecting the boundaries set by the Hadi government, the STC and its supporters penetrated state structures and employed them for their benefit. At times, the two sides work alongside each other. For example, in May 2019, the governor visited the frontline in northern al-Dhali’, joined by local STC leader General Abdullah Mahdi Saeed, as well as al-Dhali’ Chief of Police General Saleh Shaif.^[7] In late 2018, the governor gathered the governorate’s security leaders in an effort to improve cooperation; the meeting ended with a visit to a Security Belt forces’ camp where all factions present vowed to cooperate.

Since mid-2017, the STC has built various institutions, and in doing so, established itself even further as a quasi-government. The STC has governorate-level representative offices outside of Aden^[8]. The Security Belt and the southern resistance are the military wings of the STC. Military leaders from the Security Belt and southern resistance agreed that both forces are united in interest and receive their commands from the STC^[9]. A large part of al-Dhali’ and its state institutions, including the police, is de facto under the control of the STC and its armed supporters.^[10] It is revealing that residents of al-Dhali’ and YPC researchers viewed the southern forces, such as the resistance, the Security Belt and the STC, as state actors, demonstrating the influential position of the STC in the governorate. Moreover, when the respondents were asked about whom they trust to maintain security in al-Dhali’, they unanimously referred to the STC.